Family Security Matters » Publications » Exclusive: Rush to Danger: Russia’s Arms Control Proposals Would Leave U.S. and Allies in Greater Peril

Family Security Matters » Publications » Exclusive: Rush to Danger: Russia’s Arms Control Proposals Would Leave U.S. and Allies in Greater Peril

There are a few quotes that Mr. Obama might be well advised to remember at this point in time:

'Here's my strategy on the Cold War: We win, they lose.'
'The trouble with our liberal friends is not that they're ignorant; it's just that they know so much that isn't so.'
'Of the four wars in my lifetime, none came about because the U.S. was too strong.'

- Ronald Reagan


Since the SALT Treaty of 1972, running through the INF Treaty of 1987 and START I and II, and the Moscow Treaty of 2002, every American administration has tried to secure greater crisis stability and stronger deterrence. Most have sought and secured a reduction in the ratio of Soviet or Russian strategic nuclear weapons to U.S. missiles and bombers or platforms. Under SALT, this involved a growth in overall warhead numbers but some limits on launchers which at least capped the potential growth of both our arsenals. The growth was such, however, that the “correlation of forces” tilted decidedly toward the Soviet Union.



Under START I and II, the Reagan and Bush administrations pursued a deliberate policy of reductions and de-mirving the most dangerous of nuclear weapons, the fast flying nearly 100% on-alert land based missiles. Weapons with large numbers of warheads, one 10-warhead missile for example, could theoretically take out as many as 10 missile silos on the other side and thus were viewed as “unstable weapons.” You took out more of the “other guys stuff” than you used up in doing so. In a crisis, the country that went first had the advantage.

START I and II, (although the latter never went into force) and the Moscow Treaty reversed that trend. At 2,200 warheads, the Moscow Treaty limits, the Russians could have roughly 450 launchers – land based and sea based missiles and strategic bombers. They want to get rid of their older land based missiles but this would leave them with probably less than 300 launchers. The United States has 450 Minuteman, 336 D-5 submarine launched missiles on 14 boats and over 70 strategic capable bombers, or roughly 850 launchers on platforms numbering slightly above 500.

The Russians are apparently proposing to reduce launchers to 300 or less – the number of launchers they will have in their inventory by the middle of next decade – of which 80 percent will be “modern.” This would leave a ratio of at least seven Russian warheads for every U.S. launcher compared to today’s Moscow Treaty ratio of two Russian warheads for every American launcher. Even at the new proposed number of 1,500 warheads for each side and 300 launchers, numbers the Russians have discussed, the ratio would be at least five Russian warheads for every U.S. launcher but upward of 100 to 1 depending on how the U.S. deployed its limited launchers. The ratio of Russian warheads – 2,200 – to U.S. platforms, (land-based missiles, submarines and bombers) under the Moscow Treaty would be three to one. But with 1,500 warheads and 300 launchers, (and probably far fewer platforms), the ratio would be considerably worse – five to seven to ten to one. This would be a complete reversal from previous arms control progress. Instead of promoting crisis stability and deterrence, we would be pushing toward greater danger—tempting our adversaries to launch quickly in a crisis. Such a condition must be avoided at all costs.

As the Strategic Posture Commission of the United States report said, we must preserve our Triad of forces. Should the Nuclear Posture Review so find, we can further reduce warheads while maintaining the current force of launchers and achieve the goal of greater stability, and further push away from the dangers of prompt launch. The U.S. posture of 450 Minuteman missiles, each with one warhead, preserves our deterrent against a sudden or cheap attack in a crisis. With so many missiles deployed over five states, a U.S. President would be under no pressure to use them or lose them.” Our 14 submarines, of which four are at sea would also be preserved in a crisis because of the inability of an adversary to take out all of our strategic retaliatory capability. Our strategic bombers add to this strong deterrent.

Moscow may be only able to maintain fewer than 300 launchers and far fewer platforms. With a GDP the equivalent to Spain, the Russians do not have the funds available to maintain a larger force. However, the United States must maintain an extended deterrent for our NATO and other allies. Reducing our forces to some arbitrary number simply to match Moscow’s dwindling strategic force makes no sense, especially in light of Moscow’s force of thousands of additional tactical nuclear weapons which are not going to be considered under the new ceiling of 1,500-1,700 warheads and its ongoing modernization and its military doctrine of using nuclear weapons “early and often.” There is thus no reason to “rush to danger” which Moscow’s proposals imply.

So, too, with missile defense. Russia wants overall caps on the number of interceptors. However, Moscow does not control the number of offensive ballistic missiles being deployed by our adversaries and rogue states. We have an obligation to protect ourselves and our allies. Ballistic missile defense adds to deterrence, adds to crisis stability, and takes away from countries such as Iran, North Korea or China an unfettered ability to militarily coerce or blackmail their neighbors.

Reducing our platforms or launchers to less than 300; capping ballistic missile defenses; and leaving aside the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons are Russian proposals to which the United States should say an emphatic “no.” There is no reason to “rush to danger.” We can extend verification protocols for the Moscow Treaty using elements of START; we can put together a cooperative framework for missile defense deployments in Europe and elsewhere hopefully with Russian cooperation; and we can concentrate on the proliferation dangers in Iran and North Korea.